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Music and Incitement to Violence: Anti-Muslim Hate Music in Burma/Myanmar 
by Heather MacLachlan 
Accepted for publication in Vol. 66, No. 2 of Ethnomusicology (ISSN 0014-1836) 
One of the world’s greatest human rights crises is unfolding on the border between 
Bangladesh and Myanmar (a country also known as Burma).1 Approximately one million people 
from the Rohingya ethnic group have fled Myanmar, settling into huge refugee camps near 
Cox’s Bazar. Rohingya people, who are Muslim by faith, have been leaving Myanmar in great 
numbers since 2012, when anti-Muslim violence broke out in Rakhine State in the westernmost 
part of the country. The United Nations Fact Finding Mission which investigated this violence 
characterized these events as “gravest crimes” and concluded that they were committed with 
“genocidal intent” (Human Rights Council 2018:1, 16). Independent nation states and municipal 
authorities similarly criticized the Myanmar government - which oversees the national army 
judged responsible for most of the burnings, rapes, torture, and killings of Rohingya people - in 
the strongest of terms. The United States, for example, claimed that violence leveled against the 
Rohingya constituted “ethnic cleansing” (U.S. Department of State 2017). Canada’s Senate made 
the unprecedented move of formally revoking the honorary Canadian citizenship earlier 
bestowed on Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s head of state, calling her “an accomplice of a 
genocide” (Harris 2018).  For the same reason, both the city of Oxford (in the United Kingdom) 
and the city of Dublin (in the Republic of Ireland) revoked Suu Kyi’s Freedom of the City 
awards (Grierson 2017; Kelly 2017).  In this article I explain that the persecution of the 
 
1 The country was known as Burma until 1990, and as Myanmar after that. At the time of publication of this article, 
it is referred to in media and scholarly sources by both names. In this article, when referencing historical events or 
ideas before 1990, I write “Burma,” and when referencing post-1990 events and ideas, I write “Myanmar.”  In a 
few instances, when referring to the long sweep of history, I write “Burma/Myanmar.” 
 
Rohingya, which captured the world’s attention, is in fact only one outcome of a broadly 
dispersed and historically rooted prejudice against Muslims in Myanmar, a prejudice long held 
and promoted by members of the majority population, who are Theravada Buddhists. Secondly, I 
argue that contemporary popular music plays a role in fostering this prejudice. A small corpus of 
recently recorded songs, available throughout Myanmar via the internet, contain lyrics that 
articulate the main themes of the anti-Muslim ideology which undergirds the violence to which 
the Rohingya and other Myanmar Muslims have been subjected.2 As the comments left by 
YouTube.com listeners make evident, the songs are well understood to be advocating hatred of 
Myanmar Muslims. Ultimately, this article argues that these songs are inciting persecution of 
Muslim people in Myanmar, and that the creators and distributors of the songs are therefore 
complicit in the ethnic cleansing and genocidal violence perpetrated against Muslims during the 
past decade.  
It is my hope that this article will be of interest to ethnomusicologists who study music in 
all contexts, both inside and outside Southeast Asia.  Ethnomusicologists are becoming more 
accepting of the possibility that our academic work can play a role in advocating for a more just 
world.  One of the steps we take in acting for justice is to first identify and analyze situations that 
are unjust.  As uncomfortable as it may be for scholars who - like me - are devoting their lives to 
the study and teaching of music, we must illuminate situations in which music plays a role in 
 
2  For the purposes of this research, I restrict my analysis to songs posted on YouTube.com.  There are other 
Burmese language anti-Muslim hate songs that circulate elsewhere on the internet.  For example, a song called 
“Buddha’s Tribe” is featured on the Facebook page for the Buddha Dhamma Parita Foundation, a group that is 
explicitly committed to “protecting” Buddhism from Muslims. This song repeats the same themes and garners the 
same kinds of responses from listeners (evident from comments on the Facebook page) as do the songs I describe 
in this article.  
 
destroying human life and human potential.  To understand how music can inflict damage is, in 
the long term, to work toward understanding how it can heal and uplift.  
Music and the incitement of violence 
In the twenty-first century, scholars of music began investigating how music is linked to 
violence. This line of inquiry represents an important turn for the field, especially for studies of 
popular music, the kind of music I analyze in this article. As Martin Cloonan and Bruce Johnson 
wrote in 2002, scholars of popular music through the twentieth century demonstrated “a 
tendency to represent popular music as a redemptive and emancipatory force which opposes 
conservative and historically entrenched music discourses, but to deny or ignore its darker side,” 
consistently validating the premise that “popular music is universally a ‘good thing’” (2002:28). 
In their article, Cloonan and Johnson documented examples of music being deliberately used to 
cause pain, as a form of “sonic aggression” and “oppression” (2002:32 and 34). Following this 
lead, Suzanne Cusick explained how extremely loud music was used by American soldiers as a 
component of harsh interrogation techniques in prison camps in Afghanistan, Iraq and Cuba 
(2008). Other scholars have analyzed situations in which the link between music and violence is 
less direct. For example, John McDowell’s book about the tragic corridos of Mexico’s Costa 
Chica showed that “the ballads composed and sung on the Costa Chica do contribute to the 
perpetuation of violence in this zone” (2000:6), although he acknowledged that it is impossible 
to claim that corridos are directly responsible for violent acts, because most listeners do not act 
out the violence they hear about in the corridos (2002:216). A number of other scholars have 
gone on to make the same nuanced conclusion, that is, that hateful lyrics contained in appealing 
musical packages can “shape our imaginary, our sense of the possible” (Johnson and Cloonon 
 
2008:103) but generally cannot be shown to actually cause physical violence (see Kahn-Harris 
2004:5, McDonald 2009:82, Sugarman 2010:33; Baker 2013).  
As this literature has developed, calls have emerged for studies of how music does – or 
does not – incite physical violence, including in the pages of this journal (O’Connell 2011:118; 
see also O’Connell 2010:11). Here again Bruce Johnson and Martin Cloonan led the way, 
devoting an entire chapter in their 2008 book to “Music and Incitement to Violence.” Johnson 
and Cloonan depend on the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of incitement; they therefore 
focus on lyrics which “urge or persuade [listeners] to act in a violent or unlawful way” 
(2008:95). The authors explain that lyrics which incite listeners to violence are found in 
children’s playground songs, gangsta rap songs, hate music produced by neo-Nazi groups, and 
Jamaican ragga, concluding that “what appears to be incontrovertible is that pop and popular 
musics can and do ‘incite’ violence” (2008:122). They go on to delineate how music causes 
arousal, that is, involuntary but “measurable physiological symptoms” (2008:124), and can 
arouse “aggressiveness,” but point out that even aggressive arousal is not usually discharged in 
violent action (2008:139). Jonathan Pieslak has also taken on the question of arousal caused by 
listening to music, finding that heavy metal and rap music were often listened to by American 
soldiers as an “inspiration for combat” (2009:46), and theorizing that the “relentlessness” of 
these musics facilitated a kind of trance, an altered state of mind necessary for killing (2009:164-
167). In later work focused on violent radical groups, Pieslak concludes that music often 
functions to arouse emotion in its listeners: “The ability of music to invest the listener with 
emotion, at the possible expense of a rational contemplation of its message, may be one of the 
principal reasons why the art form has been afforded a prominent position in the propaganda 
efforts of almost every nationalist, religious, or ideologically driven group in history. Music can 
 
represent the pinnacle of human artistic expression, or it can be commandeered to etch a 
particular message in one’s mind by playing on emotional responses that can circumvent critical 
reflection on the message” (2015:238). However, Pieslak immediately followed this by denying 
that there is a clear causal relationship between music and physical violence, because “music 
does not affect all listeners in the same way” (2015:240).  
In this article, I argue that music can indeed incite physical violence, and it is doing so in 
Myanmar today. Importantly, I do not claim that any person or group of persons in Myanmar 
ever listened to an inciting song and subsequently committed violence against Muslim victims as 
a direct result of being inspired by the song. I have no evidence of any such cause-effect 
relationship and have never heard of, nor read, reports of it. This reality in no way undermines 
my contention, however. The definition of incitement articulated by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is the definition I rely on below, and as we will see, this definition 
expressly differentiates between inciting speech and later violent acts. The ICTR definition 
clearly reveals that “the fact that [a] message, widely diffused through [mass media], could not 
be directly tied to specific acts of killing would not absolve the message’s master of the crime of 
genocide” (Gordon 2004:170). The stakes, therefore, are extremely high: when condemning 
certain instances of music-making as incitement to violence, I am simultaneously saying that the 
makers of this music are responsible for genocide.  
One further, and important, caveat:  Although this article strongly criticizes anti-Muslim 
hate songs, it does not argue that the songs’ creators are solely, or even principally, responsible 
for the recent terrible persecutions of Muslims in Myanmar.  I explicitly do not claim the songs 
are “a crucial factor in inciting” violence (as other hate music was found to be in the Rwandan 
genocide), but rather that they are one factor, and a factor that merits our scholarly attention 
 
(McCoy 2019:420).  It is impossible to quantify the songs’ impact on Burmese listeners at large, 
and I acknowledge that, in comparison to the most popular of Burmese pop songs archived on 
YouTube.com, the songs under discussion here have comparatively few views.  Anti-Muslim 
hate songs and the musicians who create them are not primarily, and arguably, not even very 
deeply culpable in recent crimes against humanity in Myanmar.  Nevertheless, to the extent that 
the hate speech contained in the lyrics of these songs do incite violence - by influencing the 
thoughts of listeners and by contributing to an ongoing discriminatory discourse - the songs, I 
argue, must be taken seriously and subjected to rigorous academic analysis.  “To recognize the 
importance of incitement in causing genocide is not to ignore the role played by longstanding 
racial and ethnic prejudices. Incitement does not necessarily induce people to act against their 
own beliefs; when hate speech incites, it does so because the listener is receptive to such speech. 
Nor does the incitement theory argue that people who participate in genocide may be absolved of 
responsibility because they lack the will to behave differently. It is simply to highlight the power 
of media-borne messages to influence people….” (Benesch 2004:63). 
Anti-Muslim Hate Songs 
The anti-Muslim hate songs (as I am labeling them) which are the focus of this article 
are: “Losing One’s Nationality is a Concerning Issue;” “A New 969 Song;” “Brave-Hearted 
Man;” “You Should Not Be Cold-Hearted;” and “Oath.”3 Inside Myanmar, “Oath” is the best-
known anti-Muslim hate song, because it is often played at high volume over loudspeakers prior 
to anti-Muslim rallies. It is also the only song in this small corpus that has been discussed in the 
Western media (see Fuller 2013). These songs live primarily on the internet, where they are 
heard, commented upon, downloaded, and recommended to others, usually on Facebook, which 
 
3 See the Discography for the YouTube links to each of these songs.  
 
is the most important and most-used form of internet communication in Myanmar. In Myanmar 
today, the internet is broadly accessible; indeed, there are villages across the country where 
villagers can and do easily use the internet, via their smartphones, but still lack interior 
plumbing. I chose to analyze anti-Muslim hate songs found on YouTube.com because the 
reactions of listeners - expressed in the comments posted beneath the videos - can be clearly 
linked to each individual song, and these reactions factor into my analysis below.  
As scholars who have studied the White Power Movement in the United States argue, the 
fact that White Power music is available via the internet is important not only because the music 
can therefore be widely disseminated. Internet dissemination of hate songs also allows solitary 
listeners to participate in the “broad collective experience” of associating themselves with White 
Power ideas (Futtrell, Simi and Gottschalk 2006:286) and helps to “conjure emotions and ideas 
that nourish participants’ identification with the collective ‘we’” evoked in the songs (Futrell, 
Simi and Gottschalk 2006:296). The same is true in Myanmar: listening to anti-Muslim hate 
songs on the internet helps to reinforce listeners’ notion that they belong to a collective of 
Buddhists who have a common interest, and more to the point, a common enemy in their Muslim 
countrymen. As is shown below, a majority of listeners who write YouTube comments about the 
songs openly affiliate themselves with precisely this way of thinking.  
The songs in this corpus all belong to the broad category of popular music.  Solo vocal 
lines are the musical focus in these songs and they articulate syllabic, engaging melodies 
organized in verse-chorus form.  In all of the Burmese-language anti-Muslim hate songs, the 
singers are male; even the backup singers or choruses which appear briefly seem to be all-male. 
The lead vocal melodies are accompanied by the rock band instrumentarium (drum kit, electric 
guitars and keyboards), or by digital simulacra of these instruments.  Some of the songs sound 
 
like they were recorded in professional recording studios and feature virtuosic instrumental 
playing.  “Big-Hearted Man,” for example, features a soaring electric guitar and a drum kit 
which plays a flourish of fills just before cadence points.  Other songs sound like they were 
recorded by amateurs, possibly using the microphones built into their laptop computers. “A New 
969 Song,” for example, features a guitar playing only four chords, and a muffled-sounding 
vocalist singing a repetitive melody, noticeably straining his voice to hit the highest notes.  
“Losing One’s Nationality is a Concerning Issue,” similarly, includes a muffled sung vocal part 
accompanying a rapped vocal line, and instrumental sounds that likely come from a single 
synthesizer.  When the two vocal lines converge briefly, at 1:49 in the recording, they are out of 
tune with each other.   
While the quality of the recordings varies, all anti-Muslim hate songs belong to a genre of 
music immediately recognizable to, and appreciated by, Burmese people since the late 1960s 
(MacLachlan 2011:7-8).  And this matters because, as scholar Jason McCoy found in his analysis 
of hate songs played on Rwandan national radio prior to the Rwandan genocide, embedding 
hateful lyrics in Western-sounding popular music is central to the appeal of the songs. Western 
pop music was not only well-known among Rwandan people, it was also associated with 
transnational political, economic and ideological dominance, “and thus, normalcy” (2009:94). 
The normalcy of the sound of the songs effectively “dampened the extremity of the rhetoric” and 
made the message of the lyrics “more subversively palatable” (2009:93). Presenting the hateful 
rhetoric in this appealing way “legitimated the rhetoric, and in turn, the behavior for which it 
called” (2009:94). In Myanmar, two decades after the Rwandan genocide, we are seeing the 
same phenomenon - appealing pop songs which strongly stigmatize a minority group and call for 
discriminatory action to be taken against that group. 
 
The most salient feature of Burmese-language anti-Muslim hate songs, in my view, is 
their frequent use of repetition.  In pop song form, of course, the chorus is usually repeated, and 
that is the case in all of these songs.  But the repetition in some anti-Muslim hate songs also 
extends to the phrase level, meaning that short phrases are immediately repeated.  The repeated 
phrases sometimes sound like call-and-response, because the first iteration is sung by a soloist, 
and the second is sung by (what sounds like) a chorus.  This kind of repetition is especially 
evident in “You Should Not Be Cold-Hearted” and “Oath.”  In both of those songs, the repeated 
phrases are often very short, consisting of just three to five pitches.  The result of this kind of 
musical construction is that listeners can easily sing along; they can echo the simple phrases they 
have just heard, keeping in time with the lead singer as he moves on to the next short phrase.  
Making anti-Muslim hate songs easy to sing along with increases the chance that listeners will 
actively participate in the songs, articulating their messages in their own voices.  It therefore 
heightens the possibility that listeners will actively associate themselves with the collective of 
Buddhists who are the subject of, the narrators of, and the intended audience of, anti-Muslim 
hate songs. 
Readers will note that my descriptions of Burmese anti-Muslim hate songs are somewhat 
guarded; I write that all the singers of these songs “seem to be” men, for example.  My analysis 
of the songs does not include ethnographic findings from the creators of these songs - although it 
is not for lack of trying that these findings are absent. When I first became interested in these 
songs, in early 2018, I was teaching at a university in Yangon (the largest city in Myanmar). I 
had not yet heard any of the songs, but I was aware of their existence. I asked my students - 
intelligent and energetic young people, one and all - for help in locating recordings of the songs, 
but they all claimed ignorance. Later, after I had located the recording of “Oath,” I played it in an 
 
open area; two students passing by heard the recording and sang along (field notes, March 22, 
2018). The students then acknowledged that they did know this particular song, but continued to 
deny any further knowledge of any other anti-Muslim hate songs. I observed this kind of denial 
in dozens of potential informants during subsequent months.  I was able to identify some 
listeners of these songs, and I tracked down contact information for some of the usernames 
employed by those who posted the songs on YouTube.com. (“A New 969 Song,” for example, 
was posted by an association of the same name, and the association is also listed as the performer 
of the song).   However, in all but two cases (two adult men who had downloaded one or more of 
these songs on their cellphones), every person I contacted denied knowing anything about the 
songs and/or said they were unwilling to grant me an interview (personal communication, Aung 
Maung, April 10, 2018; personal communication, Thang Ngat, April 27, 2018). One of the most 
vivid examples of the denial of knowledge of this repertoire occurred when a young woman told 
me that her mother sang “a song that says something like, ‘Don’t buy from Muslims’” to the 
mother’s students at dhamma school (interview, Thazin Thin, March 20, 2018). (Dhamma 
schools are Buddhist Sunday schools for children).  I asked the woman to phone her mother to 
confirm the lyrics of the song. In my hearing, the woman’s mother initially acknowledged that 
she knew the song to which her daughter referred, and said that she taught it to students because 
“it is part of the curriculum” of the dhamma school.  However, the mother subsequently called 
back, insisting that the opposite was true:  the song, she said, was not part of the curriculum, and 
she herself never sang it.   
 
I had many similar experiences, with people from all walks of life, including a Buddhist 
monk (personal communication, Ashin Uttama, May 29, 2018).4  Finally, my study became 
focused on the songs as I found them on YouTube.com, and on the comments that listeners left 
underneath.  This project is therefore an example of a “fully online research” project, in which I 
was a “non-participant observer,” reading and listening to public online communications without 
interacting with those communicators (Przybylski 2021:26). Ultimately I decided that this was 
sufficient, because investigating the motivations and actions of specific people involved in anti-
Muslim hate songs would be of limited value.  Hateful texts, such as the words in these songs, 
derive their power to incite violence because they are part of a much wider and historically 
rooted discourse which gives particular resonance to words, such as ethnic or racial slurs (Butler 
1997:51).  It is therefore impossible to identify any particular producer or consumer of hateful 
speech (such as a composer, performer, or listener) as singularly responsible for the harm caused 
by the hateful lyrics in a song - and it would be somewhat beside the point, because the 
prejudiced and discriminatory ideas distilled in a song are so widely held and promoted (Butler 
1997:52).  The twenty-first century anti-Muslim hate songs that are the focus of this article are 
part of a long and terrible history of Islamophobia in Burma/Myanmar. 
Muslims and Islamophobia in Myanmar 
The large majority of the population of the country of Myanmar are Theravada 
Buddhists. However, minority religions, including animism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam 
have many adherents in Myanmar, and generally, in urban areas, these various religious groups 
have coexisted peacefully. The largest city in Myanmar is Yangon, and residents of Yangon are 
 
4 Note that sociologists attempting to research the music of the White Power movement in the United States faced 
similar difficulties (Futrell, Simi and Gottschalk 2006:280). 
 
proud to point out that the city center, where a large roundabout is located, exemplifies their 
history of religious diversity. Clustered around City Hall, several large religious buildings stand: 
the Sule Pagoda, the Immanuel Baptist Church, and the Sunni Jameh Mosque.  It is worth 
mentioning that the respect shown by many Burmese people to those of other religious 
backgrounds is genuine, and there are many - some of whom I have met - who reject the anti-
Muslim discourse circulating in their country.  To give just one example:  the Buddhist monk 
who is the leading figure in Myanmar’s anti-Muslim movement, U Wirathu, has been sharply 
and publicly criticized by other monks for engaging in “hate speech,” and was even banned from 
preaching for one year, from March 2017 to March 2018, by Myanmar’s highest governing 
authority for Buddhism (Htun Khaing 2018).  Indeed, there is even a pop song, found on 
YouTube, that criticizes U Wirathu and urges listeners, “Let’s fight Wirathu.”5  With that said, 
Islamophobia is alive and well in Myanmar, and I argue that this prejudice is a result of the 
ethnonationalism (which is to say, the racism) that pervades Myanmar society, and which 
informs citizens’ understanding of group identities. 
 Religious adherence in Myanmar tends to overlap with ethnic identity. Buddhists in 
Myanmar are mostly members of the Myanmar lu-myo, or ethnic group; in English this ethnic 
group is known as Burman. On the other hand, the Chin lu-myo and the Kachin lu-myo are over 
ninety percent Christian, as are large numbers of the Karen lu-myo. It was during colonial times, 
when waves of Christian conversion began, but remained almost entirely restricted to members 
of ethnic minorities, that Burmese people began to repeat the aphorism, “To be Burman is to be 
Buddhist” (Schrober 2011:2).  Many – though definitely not all – of the Muslims in Myanmar 
are members of other ethnic groups, groups which are descended from ancestors who originated 
 
5 See the discography for the link to this song, which is titled “Wirathu.” 
 
in India. In other words, they are of the South Asian, rather than of the Southeast Asian, 
phenotype (Yegar 1972:13). South Asians tend to be taller than Southeast Asians, and they tend 
to have darker skin. One Burmese word for such people is kala lu-myo; this word can mean, 
“person with dark skin,” or “Indian,” or “Muslim” (Nyi Nyi Kyaw 2015:56).  
Burmese people tend to conflate the adherents of Islam with people who appear to be of 
South Asian descent; they often use the term kala lu-myo to describe both groups. There is a 
growing consensus that the word kala is a deeply pejorative term (Metro 2016:221; Robinne 
2016:349), so much so that in June 2012 three state-owned newspapers published “corrections” 
(but not apologies) for having printed the word kala (Nyi Nyi Kyaw 2015:56).6 Today Muslims 
constitute approximately four percent of the population of Myanmar; this percentage is 
approximate because some Muslims, including most Rohingya people, have been denied 
National Registration identification cards and are therefore not included in the official population 
count (Wade 2017:49). 
Islam has a long presence in Myanmar, particularly in the western part of the country 
(Yegar 1972). This history is deeply contested, with pro-Muslim writers stating that it can be 
traced back one thousand years. Jacques Leider points out that the most reliable historical 
sources suggest that large numbers of Muslims from Bengal, India, settled in what is now 
Rakhine State in Myanmar between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries (Leider 2016:166-
167). It seems clear that large numbers of Muslims from India came to Myanmar both before and 
after British colonization, which began in the early nineteenth century. Thant Myint-U, writing 
about the first British colonial incursions into Burma, which began in 1824, argues that “all 
 
6 Facebook, for its part, banned the use of this word in May 2017 (Irrawaddy 2017). 
 
subsequent nationalist thinking harks back to this moment, when the empire was brought to its 
knees by invaders from the west, as the beginning of an alien interregnum” (2020:15). The idea 
that foreigners from the west - that is, kala lu-myo - are determined to undermine and take 
control of Burma’s great Buddhist civilization is the “nationalist mythology [that has] been 
taught in schools or universities for generations” (Thant Myint-U 2020:188; Nyi Nyi Kyaw 
2020).  
Knowing that this understanding of history is predominant among Burman Buddhists 
explains why they originally applied the word kala to their British overlords. In the twentieth 
century, the foreigners from the west - the kala lu-myo of the Burman imagination - became the 
Indian immigrants who arrived in great numbers; by 1921 there were one million Indians (about 
half of whom were Muslims) among the eleven million Burmans of Burma (Yegar 1972:31). 
Although many Indian immigrants worked as unskilled and poorly-paid laborers, many others 
worked in the British colonial government offices. The urban Muslim Indians established 
mosques and madrassas, making themselves and their non-Buddhist faith visible in the important 
population centers. “The conspicuous concentration of Indians in [the capital city of] Rangoon 
and in other urban areas helped confirm the Burmese impression that the immigrants were 
dispossessing them of their country” (Yegar 1972:32). One sub-group of the Indian immigrants, 
Chettiars from Tamil Nadu (who were Hindus), established a vast money-lending system in 
colonial Burma. In various parts of the country, Chettiar moneylenders controlled between 
seventy and one hundred percent of all the capital that was borrowed by Burmese citizens 
(Turnell 2009:18). Although the Chettiars were eventually expelled from Burma, their memory 
lives on; they – and by extension all the members of the remaining kala lu-myo – continue to be 
 
a deeply resented group in the minds of many contemporary Burmese people (Turnell 2009:13; 
also Brant 1954:32).  
“Rampant xenophobia” is a persistent problem in Myanmar (Robinne 2016:349); it is not 
an accident that the country’s 2008 constitution withholds the presidency from any citizen who is 
the child of, the spouse of, or the parent of, a foreigner.7 Prejudice against Muslims, specifically, 
requires a further explanation. I contend that this prejudice has little, if anything, to do with 
opposition to Islam. Indeed, most Burmese people have an extremely limited knowledge of the 
tenets of the Muslim faith. Rather, anti-Muslim prejudice is largely based on a racist ideology 
which claims that the kala lu-myo, an ethnic group with a different skin pigmentation than that of 
Buddhist Southeast Asians, are outsiders and aliens; for this reason, Reneaud Egreteau 
characterizes it as “Indophobia” (2011).8 This racist idea is augmented by a longstanding class-
based resentment, which has, for two centuries and more, identified “foreigners” as “the 
precipitators of economic devastation” (Prasse-Freeman and Phyo Winn Latt 2018:407). 
Ultimately, this way of thinking concludes that the kala lu-myo are the enemies of the majority 
Buddhist population, and are determined to take political and economic control over the country, 
just as their ancestors once did. Disturbingly, other scholars have noted that the two intertwined 
strains of the ideology I have outlined here are found in other parts of Southeast Asia, where 
“black” skin is a stigmatizing feature (High 2014:70-72) and where recent manifestations of anti-
 
7 This constitutional requirement explains why Aung San Suu Kyi, although she is the most powerful civilian in the 
country and the head of the party holding the majority of the seats in the Hluttaw, or Parliament, did not hold the 
title of “President.” She was once married to a British citizen, and her two sons are British citizens. 
8 In 2010, Myanmar’s consul general in Hong Kong, Ye Myint Aung, said publicly that Rohingya people are not one 
of Myanmar’s ethnic groups (rather, that they are illegal immigrants from Bangal), and that this is evident in their 
skin color and their ugliness (Thant Myint-U 2020:128). 
 
Muslim hatred are the result of their status as a minority group that is “dominant [or perceived to 
be dominant] in the economic sphere” (Osman 2017:17). 
Anti-Muslim prejudice in Burma/Myanmar has repeatedly led to outbreaks of violence 
against Muslims. Anti-Indian riots flared up in 1930 and again in 1938 in the capital city; during 
the 1938 events “hundreds were wounded and killed, millions of rupees’ worth of property was 
damaged and 113 mosques were set afire” (Yegar 1972:37). In 1978, a “pogrom” against 
Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State forced 200,000 Rohingya refugees to flee to Bangladesh 
(Wade 2017:92). In March of 1997, Buddhist monks in Mandalay “went on a rampage, 
vandalizing mosques and desecrating Korans” (Matthews 1999:50). Beginning in 2012, extreme 
violence has been leveled against Muslims in towns and cities across the country; the violence 
committed against Rohingya Muslims living in the far west is the most devastating, but by no 
means the only, instance of contemporary anti-Muslim activity in Myanmar (Wade 2017:137-
142; Cheesman 2017:336-338). Importantly, twenty-first century manifestations of anti-Muslim 
violence arose at the same time as national organizations focused on the “protection” of 
Buddhism. These organizations, led and promoted by charismatic Buddhist monks, have 
established dhamma schools, have lobbied for legal restrictions to be placed on Muslims by state 
and national governing bodies, and have held large, public rallies dedicated to furthering “the 
narrative that posits Buddhism as under threat from Islam” (Walton 2014; Hayward and 
Frydenlund 2019:2-4). 
Scholars of the history of anti-Muslim violence in Burma/Myanmar argue that the 
occurrences of the twenty-first century are fundamentally different from earlier outbreaks. Peter 
Coclanis, for example, says that the “sectarian conflict” of the twenty-first century is “now more 
akin to terrorism” (2013:29). Min Zin argues that anti-Muslim riots and conflicts of earlier times 
 
“tended to be one-time events;” what distinguishes the violent actions of the last decade is that 
they are perpetrated and “sustained over time as a series of organized campaign [sic]” 
(2015:378). Min Zin goes on to explain that the “organized campaign” of the past decade is 
fueled by “a new variable, which is undeterred propagation of hate speech coupled with clear 
political coordination. Unlike under previous regimes, where anti-Muslim hate speech was word-
of-mouth propaganda manufactured by military intelligence officers or underground 
publications, people can now hear vitriolic attacks against Muslims in [Buddhist] religious 
sermons from the intrusive loudspeakers of local monasteries or donation stations. People 
encounter hate speech in books and handouts, watch it on DVDs that are conveniently available 
from sellers at almost every traffic junctions [sic], and on social media” (2015:378-379; see also 
Brac de la Perrière 2016:334). “Spectacular pictures” of violent scenes, attributed to Muslims 
with “extreme bias” in social media postings, most especially, are crucial in persuading “large 
numbers of people that Buddhism [is] in danger, and that action [is] needed in its defense” (van 
Klinken and Su Mon Thazin Aung 2017:367). Burmese-language hate speech on social media 
has even become a focus of concern in the United States. In April 2018 Mark Zuckerberg, the 
Chief Executive Officer of Facebook, was called to testify before the United States Congress, 
and was grilled about his company’s hosting of thousands of Burmese-language anti-Muslim 
texts and videos (Stecklow 2018). As the previous two paragraphs demonstrate, scholars of 
Burma/Myanmar and concerned parties worldwide have been attentive to the important role that 
hate speech, especially that disseminated by Facebook, is playing in anti-Muslim violence in 
Myanmar. None, however, have acknowledged that the post-2012 anti-Muslim discourse is also 
present in popular songs, nor that these songs are hosted on YouTube, a social media giant which 
 
has never been held to account for its role in fostering the prejudice that underpins the recent 
violence. 
Anti-Muslim Discourse in Burmese Language Hate Songs 
Burmese language hate songs express the anti-Muslim ideology - the hate speech 
described by Min Zin, above - that has been publicly preached by Buddhist monks since 2012, 
disseminated by lay Buddhist organizations, and believed by Buddhists across Myanmar. The 
best-known of these monks, mentioned above, is U Wirathu. He is a fiery preacher who is 
extolled and praised in the song “Brave-Hearted Man,” in which the singer repeats the name 
“Wirathu” over and over during the chorus:   
 
Yaan hcwal tway mahtarr antayaltwaykyarr ngyaimchamyayy tanhkarrtway hpwint metsuu  
Amidst the dangers, without anger, he will open the door of peace  
 
De kabarmyay tatlwhar suuloluu sharr  
It is so rare to come across someone like him in this world 
 
Nhalonesarr yell yint mhu tway pya maesuu  
Someone who has a courageous heart 
As we will see, this song also refers to the broader themes that recur constantly in the 
Burmese anti-Muslim discourse. These four themes are: 
 
Citizenship in Myanmar, Burman ethnicity, and adherence to Buddhism are inextricably linked - 
and therefore, Muslims do not belong (or should not belong) to the Myanmar nation 
Burmese language anti-Muslim hate songs advance an exclusionary ideology, a way of 
thinking that “excludes categories of people defined in terms of class, belief, or ethnicity from 
the universe of obligation” (Harff and Gurr 1998:561). In Myanmar, this exclusionary ideology 
proclaims that Muslim people should be excluded from the country, both legally and physically. 
More specifically, the Myanmar version of exclusionary ideology is an ethnonationalist ideology 
which assumes that the nation state is - or should be - the domain of one ethnic group, that of the 
Burman majority. Burman ethnicity, or Myanma lu-myo is, in this way of thinking, coterminous 
with adherence to Buddhism, such that “to be Burman is to be Buddhist,” as the old slogan says. 
It is this simplistic conviction that fuels the sense that Muslim people do not belong in the nation 
of Myanmar. Recent scholarship on the rapidly-changing situation in Myanmar points out that 
even as the country is emerging from its long and destructive period of political isolation, this 
exclusionary ideology has increased in power - perhaps in response to “dissatisfaction with 
modernization” (Thant Myint-U 2020:208).  
Charles Carstens has recently documented the emergence of a new way that some 
Myanmar Buddhists identify themselves, as Buddha-batha-lu-myo, meaning that they are of 
“Buddhist-ethnicity” (2018:127-128). As Carstens points out, “self-identifying with Buddhist-
ethnicity makes a political intervention...Buddhist-ethnicity marshals private citizens to stand in 
unity and security. Bound by a common religion...differences among Buddhists are made 
irrelevant. This group is set against a racialized non-Buddhist outsider,” which is, of course, the 
 
Muslims of Myanmar (2018:129).9 The ethnonationalist ideology that excludes Muslims from 
Myanmar is widespread among private citizens, and it is reinforced by government apparatuses. 
Carstens recounts the experience of a Burman Muslim man who applied for a National 
Registration identification card, writing “Myanmar” in the space for ethnicity, and “Muslim” in 
the space for religion. When the card was issued to him, he discovered that his ethnicity was 
listed as “Pakistan;” apparently the clerk who processed his application could not or would not 
accept the reality that a person of Muslim faith can simultaneously be of the Burman Myanmar 
ethnicity (2018:128). As François Robinne summarizes, “for the Burmese government, being 
Muslim is tantamount to being Indian, that is to say, being Kala” (2016:352).  
Here is how the exclusionary ideology is expressed in song - note the strong “us versus 
them” language, in which “we” and “our” are always understood to mean Myanmar Buddhists, 
and “they” and “their” always refers to Muslims:  
 
Thoet myaypawnay thoet yaykosout thoetmyayaout thoethceepwarr thoet sameeraeehcarr ma 
htout nyhar hcawkarr  
They live on our land and drink our water.  They use our underground resources and our 
businesses.  They insult our girlfriends. 
 
Aainshin pyitmhar aahkaat ko hkyoeswarr  
They insult the host and attack  
 
9 The slippage between ethnic or racial identification and religious adherence can be seen in a recent publication 
by a Burman author, who writes of Myanmar’s “Buddhist race” (Nyi Nyi Kyaw 2020:199 and 217). 
 
 
Kyaayyjuu ma htouttae lhu attamyarr  
Ungrateful egoistic people 
(from “Oath”) 
 
Tineyinnsarr htel mhar muusalin sotar tatyoutmha maparbhuu  
There are no Muslims among the ethnic groups [of Myanmar] 
 
Dar kyaung ngarthoet pyi mhar muusalintway shi ma nay sint bhuu  
Therefore, there should be no Muslims in our country 
(from “Losing One’s Nationality is a Concerning Issue”) 
 
Nwarr kwaltot kyarr win swalmaallay 
If the cows are divided, the tiger will take advantage of them (an idiomatic expression meaning, 
a kingdom divided cannot stand) 
 
Hcaee lone mhu nae aamyoeko hcawng hteinlay  
Keep the nation unified 
 
 
Sway ma kwalnae laattway twal htarrlay  
Work together and do not be distrustful 
 
Yaansuu mhaansamyaha garu ma htuu tite htote aawayy  
Fight all enemies ruthlessly 
(from “A New 969 Song”) 
Buddhism and Buddhist people must be protected, with force if necessary 
The second major theme in the Burmese anti-Muslim discourse is that Buddhist people 
and the religion to which they adhere are under threat. The threat posed by Muslims to Buddhists 
comes in many forms, as a Buddhist monk told me: the “real goal” of the kala, he said, is to 
poison the lime powder that Burmese people mix with the betel nuts they chew daily (interview, 
U Meitiya, April 14, 2018). He pointed out that “many people” believe that “Muslim countries” 
poison the powder before exporting it to Myanmar. But, the monk continued, ultimately the kala 
will prevail by growing their population and thereby “extinguishing” the Myanmar people. The 
anti-Muslim discourse to which this monk was happy to contribute insists on this point: Burman 
Buddhists are going to lose their majority position in the population - and therefore their political 
and religious dominance – as Muslim people reproduce more rapidly. Furthermore, the discourse 
proclaims that Buddhist people will undergo forced conversions to Islam, and Buddhism will 
therefore disappear.  
 
Myanmar Buddhists are inclined to believe that Muslims are united in opposition to 
Buddhists because they have seen the numbers 786 posted in Muslim-owned shops around the 
country. The numbers refer to the numerical value (as calculated in the Arabic Abjad system) of 
the words in the opening sentence of the Koran (Coclanis 2013:27). However, Buddhist monks 
teach that these numbers are code for the year 2021, or for the twenty-first century (because 7 
plus 8 plus 6 equals 21), and that they refer to a Muslim conspiracy to take control of the country 
in the near future. Another monk named named Ashin Pyinya Siri explained this to me himself, 
insisting that he had observed the plot succeeding in a village near Tagyi: A Buddhist woman 
married a Muslim man, he said, and they had nine children. Seven of the children became 
Muslims themselves, and now the village has a population of hundreds of Muslims; they have 
even built their own mosque (personal communication, March 22, 2018). “This is the way 
Muslims take over,” he said, “they demand their own space and their own rights.” The monk 
went on to defend U Wirathu, saying that “he has good intentions.” Myanmar Buddhists take the 
teachings of monks very seriously, so when monks promote conspiracy theories claiming that 
Buddhism and Buddhists are in need of protection, they find listening ears. Anti-Muslim hate 
songs emphasize and extend the monks’ allegations:  
 
Paung chinn ka khun shit chout sonelone yae aadhi paal  
The meaning of the sum of seven, eight and six 
 
Hnit sat tit yar hcu lhoet aatiaakya sirataal  
 
Is exactly twenty-one 
 
Hnit sat tit yar hcu aakonemhar bamar twayko pyaut lhoet ko yi yawl htarr tae yi yawl chat ka 
suuthoet luumyoe yout phoet tae  
[The Muslims are] aiming that by the end of the 21st century, the Burmese will be gone and their 
people will remain 
 
De aah chain mhar twae ya laimmaal ta nine ngan lone khun shit chout  
At that time, you will see 786 nationwide 
 
Ngarthoet bamar luumyoe pyaut aaung kyaan hci laimmaal suu thoet nout  
After this, they will try to get rid of our Burmese people 
 
Ain aarr myar yin sin nwhael laimmaal hcitpwal narmai gyehaat  
When they become strong, they will declare Jihad [war] 
 
Ngaal ngaal htel ka lay kyint htarrtaal bhar sarr hcarrhcarr laihpyat  
Trained from the young age how to cut throats, 
 
 
Kalayy kalayy chinn saat luukyee luukyee chinnsaat  
Their children will kill children. Adults will kill adults. 
 
De hpyityat de hpyityat takaalkyeetway hpyit hkae pyan  
This incident, this incident, it has happened before: 
 
Nine ngan narmai aatiaakya pyawwtot aarhpagaan nit hcataan  
The exact name of the country is Afghanistan. 
(from “Losing One’s Nationality is a Concerning Issue”) 
 
Tahkyarr bharsar toetaatrayyko tahkyarr suumyarr saungrwatpye  
Others have made progress in their own religions 
 
Buddhabharsar thoettatway myarrka sway aayylhoet ma nay singpye  
Buddhists should not be cold-hearted [meaning, unconcerned] 
 
Sway aayynay yin sarsanar pyautlhoet luumyoe pyaut phoet kyone laimmye  
 
If one is cold-hearted, the religion will be lost and the nation will be lost 
(from “You Should Not Be Cold-Hearted”) 
Responding to the alleged threat to Buddhism and Buddhist people, some of the songs 
urge Buddhists not only to “work together” but to fight - that is, to engage in physical conflict 
with the enemies of Buddhism. “Losing One’s Nationality is a Concerning Issue” actually 
acknowledges that physical violence is forbidden to Buddhists:  
 
Dharr nae hkote tote nae yite de aalote tway ko bhayarr ma kyaite  
Buddha [also translated as God] does not like stabbing nor hitting  
However, the song then goes on to say:  
 
Bhar sar ta yarr ko htein saim lar tae thoet yae aabhoe aabhwarr  
Our grandparents preserved the [Buddhist] religion 
 
Thoet hkit mhar laee mapyautpyet aaung aa saat nae lellpyee kyaoe hcarr  
In our day too, we shall try to preserve it even if we must wager our lives 
 
Ngar thoet sway nae yayy hkae tae ngar thoet yae sarsanar aa yayy  
 
Our religion is written in our blood 
(from “Losing One’s Nationality is a Concerning Issue”) 
 
Noehtatot thoetmyanmartway  
Wake up, our Myanmar people! 
 
Ngarthoetaayoe hcaee yoehtoe yway kar sing hlyin kar ya mye 
We shall build a fence out of our bones should it be needed  
(from “Oath”) 
Listeners should not marry Muslims 
In light of the demographic threat that Muslims purportedly pose to Buddhists, anti-
Muslim discourse in Myanmar exhorts Buddhists not to marry Muslims, that is, not to cooperate 
with the Muslim conspiracy aiming to overtake the country in the twenty-first century.10 This 
discourse argues that in order to reduce the Muslim population in Myanmar, the majority 
population should deprive them of marriage partners. Marrying a Muslim, in this understanding, 
 
10 The fear that Buddhist women, especially, could be harmed by marriage with Muslim men may have some 
historical purchase. One of the causes of the “hatred” that led to the anti-Indian riots of 1938 was the situation of 
thousands of Buddhist women who married Muslim Indian immigrants and were subsequently abandoned by their 
husbands. These women discovered too late that they had no inheritance or legal protection when their marriages 




amounts to a betrayal of Buddhism and of the Myanmar people. Anti-Muslim hate songs state 
this explicitly: 
 
Pitesan bhaallout kyeeh chamsar chamsar laat ma htat kyanae  
Don't get married to them, no matter how much money they have 
 
Laat htat lite yin ning ko hkawmaal ‘aamyoe hpyet ma’ tae  
If you get married [to a Muslim] you will be called 'anti-nationalist' (also translated as ‘ethnic 
prostitute’) 
(from “Losing One’s Nationality is a Concerning Issue”) 
 
Aarr lone saw nye aat ko maung nha ma tway  
All brothers and sisters 
 
Koh aamyoesarr hcinn pell bhawako mway kyalay  
Live among your own people (also translated as:  Marry your fellow Buddhists) 
 
Nhalone swaykyaww aahti hcim win hcyit kyalay  
 
Love each other deeply from the heart 
 
Ma hpout hpyet nae aamyoe gontway  
Do not betray your own people (also translated as:  Do not violate the national dignity) 
(from “A New 969 Song”) 
Listeners should not patronize Muslim-owned businesses 
The fourth main theme of anti-Muslim discourse in Myanmar refers back to the long-held 
conviction that Muslim foreigners aim to financially exploit Myanmar people. Patronizing 
Muslim businesses, in this understanding, amounts to disloyalty to the Myanmar ethnic group. In 
the same way that the discourse discusses marriage to Muslims, it posits economic engagement 
with Muslims as a “betrayal” of Buddhists and Buddhism: 
 
Ngarthoet payy tae aamyat aa hcunn tway nae tite sout karr hcee taat kywa nay  
They are actively building new buildings and driving cars with the profits made from us 
 
Ngarthoet payy tae pitesan tway kyaung ngarthoet luutway dokekha yout  
Our people suffer because of our own money that we give to them 
 
 
Muusalin sine mhar win hcyaay waal nay yin aae de luu ka sithcar hpout  
If [a Buddhist] goes shopping in a Muslim shop, that person will be regarded unfaithful (as 
translated as, That person betrays Buddhist people) 
(from “Losing One’s Nationality is a Concerning Issue”) 
 
 
Thoet nyeaaitkotway thoet aamyoekaungg sarr samee twaysii sit hcar dhi htaan pyu ya mye  
Brothers and sisters, good sons and daughters, we must take an oath 
 
Aamyoe bharsar sarsanar sit hcar shiparmye  
We shall be faithful to our religion and our nationality  
 
Bharsar tuu yar sinemharsar zaayy waalparmye  
We shall only buy from the shops owned by those of same religion 
 
Bharsar tuu yar hkyinn hpyingsar hpuuhcar ywayparmye  
We shall choose to marry those of same religion  
(from “Oath”) 
 
Hateful lyrics contained in appealing pop songs not only reinforce the prejudiced thinking 
of those who listen to them, they also cause real harms to those targeted by them (Sorial 
2015:306, 321). Simon Thompson, a scholar of political theory, points out that at least three 
harms can be and are suffered by the victims of religiously-focused hate speech (2012:226-228). 
First, targets of such speech develop fear that the violence outlined in hate speech will be aimed 
at them, and this fear undermines the self-confidence that is “a vital prerequisite to all other 
positive attitudes to the self” (2012:227). Second, targets of hate speech undergo psychological 
harms. Because human beings’ sense of identity is bound up in how others perceive them and 
react to them, those who are on the receiving end of hate speech can feel their own sense of self-
worth demeaned and may develop a sense of self-hatred. Third, targets of hate speech suffer 
harm to their social status. To be a member of a group that is collectively denigrated means that 
the group member may find it unduly challenging to participate equally in society; the hate 
speech “undermines their opportunities for self-realization” (2012:228). In conducting the 
research for this article, I caught a glimpse of the harms caused by hate speech targeting 
Myanmar Muslims. For example, I was accompanied by a young Muslim woman when I listened 
to the monk named Ashin Pyinya Siri (described above) explain how Muslims are “taking over” 
the country; she was visibly dejected afterward and I felt it necessary to apologize to her. 
Similarly, the two Muslim women who translated song texts and YouTube comments for this 
article sometimes demonstrated reluctance to articulate certain sentiments in English; on a 
number of occasions, I felt compelled to ask them if they were willing to continue. 
The hate speech contained in Burmese language anti-Muslim hate songs is undoubtedly 
harmful. But do these songs actually incite violence? Can the composers, performers, producers, 
 
and distributors of these songs be held responsible, to any degree, for the genocidal crimes 
committed against Myanmar Muslims in recent years?  
Defining Incitement and Querying the Myanmar Example 
Scholarly and legal consensus on what constitutes incitement to violence, and incitement 
to genocide more specifically, is still “emerging” (Gordon 2008; Benesch 2004:64). Sarah Sorial 
recently defined incitement as “to stir up feelings of hatred, to discriminate, or in some cases, to 
cause violence against others” (2015:319). Legal scholar Susan Benesch developed a relatively 
strict test, which she calls the “reasonably possible consequences test,” to identify which 
instances of hate speech rise to the level of incitement to genocide (2008:519). The common 
threads linking these and other examinations of incitement are first, that hate speech is not 
necessarily incitement, and second, that incitement does not require a direct outcome of violence 
– that is, that incitement is not determined by a direct cause-effect relationship by the inciting 
speech and subsequently occurring violence. Rather, it is “the potential of the communication to 
cause [violence or] genocide that makes it incitement” (Gordon 2008:878, emphasis mine).  
In analyzing Burmese language anti-Muslim songs, I depend on the definition of 
incitement formulated by the judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
in what is often referred to as the Media case. The judges’ ruling in the Media case, issued in 
December 2003, is “a landmark in a developing body of international jurisprudence on 
incitement to genocide” (Benesch 2004:62). In litigating this case, the ICTR charged and 
convicted three defendants, two of whom co-founded a Rwandan radio station and one of whom 
was a newspaper editor, of “direct and public incitement to commit genocide” (Gordon 
2008:874; see also International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2003). The ICTR decision 
“identified four criteria to determine whether hate speech, [disseminated via mass media], 
 
constitutes the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression or the commission of criminal 
incitement: (1) purpose; (2) text; (3) context; (4) the relationship between speaker and subject” 
(Gordon 2008:904-905). In what follows, I apply these four criteria to anti-Muslim songs from 
Myanmar. 
Purpose: As explained above, I was unable to interview any of the composers, producers 
or singers of Burmese language anti-Muslim hate songs, and therefore I cannot quote any of 
them regarding their purposes or objectives in creating these songs. However, I argue that their 
purpose is clear and is revealed by the second criteria, their texts - noting that the ICTR made 
exactly the same argument in its Media case ruling (Gordon 2008:875). The creators of anti-
Muslim hate songs seek to contribute to and reinforce the ethnonationalist, anti-Muslim 
discourse circulating in Myanmar since 2012. This discourse has been promoted by some 
Buddhist monks, including U Wirathu, and their allies lay Buddhist organizations. That the 
monks see the songs as helpful to their purpose is evident in the fact that one of the songs, 
“Oath,” is often played at high volume prior to public preachings which are, in effect, anti-
Muslim rallies. “Oath” and other anti-Muslim songs are broadcast by lay Buddhists also, when 
they march through their neighborhoods collecting donations for local monasteries and pagodas 
(field notes, February 22, 2018 and April 5, 2018).  
Text: As the excerpts from the texts of the songs given above show, Burmese anti-
Muslim hate songs consistently exhort listeners to protect “our” culture and religion. This may 
seem to be a rather innocuous call from the perspective of an outsider. However, as legal scholar 
Susan Benesch argues, when analyzing particular instances of speech, or texts, it is important to 
focus not on all the possible interpretations of those texts, but rather, what the audience is likely 
to understand by them (2008:520). The meaning of the language used in anti-Muslim hate songs 
 
is abundantly clear to native Burmese speakers living in Myanmar today. The “we” who need to 
wake up, who must even be prepared to shed blood, are Burman Buddhists, and the “they” 
against whom “we” must protect ourselves are Muslims. “Protecting” Buddhism, in the texts of 
these songs, consists not of increasing one’s devotion to Buddhist practices but rather of 
avoiding shopping at Muslim-owned businesses and of declining to marry a Muslim. Muslims 
are depicted as engaging in broad conspiracies to take over the country; “Losing One’s 
Nationality is a Concerning Issue” even claims, without any basis, that mosques are offering 
financial incentives to Muslim men who marry unsuspecting Buddhist women. Most 
perniciously, the texts of the songs advance an exclusionary ideology that argues for excluding 
Muslims from Myanmar, and, possibly, from the land of the living. 
Context: The circumstances surrounding the dissemination of a hateful text are central to 
determining that text’s significance, as the ICTR Media case decision makes clear (Gordon 
2008:876).  Judith Butler further illuminates the importance of knowing and acknowledging the 
context of hateful speech in her critique of a 1993 United States Supreme Court decision 
(1997:51-59).  In that case, the majority opinion stated that the burning of a cross was protected 
free speech, rather than an instance of injurious speech for which the perpetrator could be 
condemned by the court.  The written decision disregarded the important contextual facts, 
namely, that a White teenager burned the cross on the front lawn of a Black family’s home.  As 
Butler points out, hateful statements and actions such as these “work” because of the history they 
draw upon (1997:51).  The White teenager did not simply set a fire in a public place, but 
consciously invoked “the racist history of the convention of cross-burning by the Ku Klux Klan 
which marked, targeted, and hence, portended a further violence against a given addressee” 
(1997:55).  Because the US Supreme Court justices did not take this contextual information into 
 
consideration, they produced a decision in which a “racist injury [was] dignified as protected 
speech” (1997:64). 
In the contemporary Myanmar context, Muslims are the target of ever-increasing 
discrimination, both legal and extra-legal. The national government’s systematic refusal to grant 
many Muslims, including most Rohingya people, legal citizenship is one of the better-known 
manifestations of this discrimination (Parashar and Alam 2019). In 2015, the Myanmar 
Parliament passed a package of four “race and religion” laws that have been internationally 
condemned as discriminatory toward Myanmar Muslims. One of the laws requires that Buddhist 
women who wish to marry non-Buddhist men must apply for the right to do so, and wait for the 
approval of local authorities – approval which, we can safely assume, may be long in coming 
(Walton, McKay and Daw Khin Mar Mar Kyi 2015:37). This law was initially proposed by U 
Wirathu, and the text was drafted by lawyers sympathetic to the Buddhist ethnonationalist cause 
(Hayward and Frydenlund 2019:5); it was presented to Parliament along with the signatures of 
2.5 million supporters (Walton, McKay and Daw Khin Mar Mar Kyi 2015:37). U Wirathu and 
his allies campaigned against the National League for Democracy (NLD) in 2015, and when the 
NLD won the election “Wirathu promised to bring the NLD down if they dared remove the 
laws” (Hayward and Frydenlund 2019:5). The months preceding the 2015 election revealed the 
dominant political culture in Myanmar: during the election campaign, the smear tactic of being 
“too Muslim-friendly” proved so effective that political parties disqualified many Muslim 
candidates who wished to stand for election (Hayward and Frydenlund 2019:5). MaBaTha, a 
Buddhist organization led by U Wirathu, also passed out stickers that were to be placed at the 
front entrance of businesses owned by Buddhists, so that consumers could target their shopping, 
avoiding Muslim-owned shops. In contrast to the 786 stickers favored by Muslims, these stickers 
 
displayed the number 969 - a number which is religiously significant to Buddhists. This is the 
reason that the Buddhist ethnonationalist movement is often glossed as the 969 movement, and 
the reason that one of the anti-Muslim songs cited above is titled “A New 969 Song.” The 
context for songs like “A New 969 Song” reveals that its words point not to some minority 
political position, or to the bizarre ideas of a splinter group, but rather to an anti-Muslim 
prejudice that is widespread and normalized among Myanmar Buddhists.  
The relationship between speaker and subject: In its ruling on the Media case, the ICTR 
carefully distinguished between speakers who express a minority, dissenting position against a 
powerful state – whose right to dissent ought to be protected by free speech laws - and speakers 
who belong to the majority and who support government policies. The relationship between the 
speaker of an inciting text and the subject about which they are speaking is inextricably tied to 
the context in which the speech occurs: if the speaker belongs to a majority group and is 
criticizing members of a minority group, at a time when the majority group is actively engaged 
in discriminating against that minority group, it is much less likely that the speech could be 
characterized as protected free speech (Gordon 2004:173-174).  Anti-Muslim hate songs from 
Myanmar are sung in Burmese, by native speakers of Burmese. From the evidence present in the 
song texts themselves, the song creators are very likely to be members of Myanmar’s Buddhist 
majority, and they explicitly espouse discriminatory ideas maintained by many Myanmar 
legislators and religious leaders. The targets of the discriminatory ideas - and calls to violent 
action - are Muslims who constitute, as we have seen, a small minority in Myanmar. 
Furthermore, members of that Buddhist majority have violently persecuted communities 
belonging to the Muslim minority on numerous occasions during the past century. The songs are 
circulating at a time when Myanmar Muslims are again subject to violent attacks, are targeted by 
 
discriminatory laws, and are vilified in Buddhist sermons and in a multitude of hateful postings 
on the internet. These songs are therefore “likely to exacerbate an already explosive situation” in 
the words of the ICTR (quoted in Gordon 2004:173), and they accentuate the threat posed by the 
majority to the minority.  
In sum: Because the works in the corpus of Burmese language anti-Muslim hate songs 
meet all four of the ICTR’s criteria for defining inciting speech, it is clear that these songs are 
examples of incitement to violence.  
Listener responses to anti-Muslim hate songs 
Listeners are able to post comments underneath YouTube.com videos. The responses to 
Burmese language anti-Muslim hate songs, captured in the comments, reveal that listeners have a 
variety of responses to the songs. The majority of the comments, however, are supportive of the 
songs and of the themes expressed in the songs’ lyrics. This conclusion emerged from an 
analysis of the comments posted for the two of the songs, “Losing One’s Nationality is a 
Concerning Issue,” and “You Should Not Be Cold-Hearted.” I focused on the comment sections 
for these two songs because these songs were, by far, the most frequently commented upon by 
listeners. As of June 2019, there were 94 comments on “Losing One’s Nationality is a 
Concerning Issue,” and 43 comments on “You Should Not Be Cold-Hearted.” Almost all of the 
comments were written in Burmese; a small minority were written in English. I grouped the 




Table 1. Categories of Comments in Response to Anti-Muslim Songs 
Nature of comment Losing One’s Nationality is a 
Concerning Issue (n=94) 
You Should Not Be Cold-
Hearted  (n=43) 
Liking the song 33%  n=31 21% n=9 
Affirming message of the song 22% n=21 49% n=21 
Explicit hate speech 18%  n=17 7% n=3 
Critiquing the song 12% n=11 0% n=0 
Unclear 15%  n=14 23% n=10 
 
A substantial number of the comments were unclear, meaning that they were so brief, and 
often misspelled, that it was impossible to make a fair determination of their meaning. Other 
comments that fell into this category were ambiguous, such as “I want to cry,” which was 
Thander Oo’s comment on “Losing One’s Nationality is a Concerning Issue.” Did Thander Oo 
want to cry because the lyrics of the song were so appalling? Or because, having listened 
carefully to the lyrics, Thander Oo was convinced that the song’s message was true? Since it was 
impossible to answer this question, the comment was labeled unclear. A smaller percentage of 
comments about “Losing One’s Nationality is a Concerning Issue” actually critiqued the song, 
contesting either its sound or its message. Examples include, “Shit song. Every fucking song is 
better than this music,” (Khinmayme Laing) and “Just fuck this song,” (ster demoe). It is 
noteworthy, however, that the critiques did not propose an alternative, more progressive 
understanding of the situation in contemporary Myanmar. One critiquing comment actually 
engaged in a different form of hate speech: “This singer’s voice lacks energy; he sounds like an 
a-chauk” (Anders K Anderson). The word a-chauk is a Burmese term for a homosexual man; 
 
like the word kala, it is now understood to be deeply insulting and is generally not used in polite 
conversation. 
The majority of the commenters on both songs said either that they enjoyed the song 
and/or that they affirmed its message. Many of these comments were either anodyne references 
to liking the song and/or thanking the poster for posting it on YouTube.com. One comment in 
this category was “Thaddu, thaddu, thaddu,” posted by Soe Soe in response “You Should Not Be 
Cold-Hearted.” This thrice-repeated word is a Burmese Buddhist blessing, usually pronounced 
by a monk over a layperson, expressing the monk’s approval of that layperson’s actions. 
Comments in a related category overtly affirmed the message of the song; sometimes, such 
comments echoed the kinds of lyrics heard across the corpus of anti-Muslim songs. For example, 
in commenting about “You Should Not Be Cold-Hearted” MaMe love wrote, “Wake up. We 
should cherish Buddhism.” Commenting about “Losing One’s Nationality is a Concerning 
Issue,” two commenters (Amyosaung Aung Kyi and Amyoti Tha Kyi) both wrote, “It is time for 
all Myanmar Buddhists to unite!” Zaw Myo, commenting on “Losing One’s Nationality is a 
Concerning Issue”’s exhortation against marriage to a Muslim, wrote, “Women should be aware 
of this and control themselves.”  
In other comments the affirmations were more general, as in May Lay’s comment on 
“Losing One’s Nationality is a Concerning Issue”: “Listen, listen Myanmar! All Myanmar, listen 
to this song.” Still other affirmations were specific, and required detailed knowledge of the 
current context to decipher. Bo Bo Win Kyait wrote in his affirming comment, “It’s time to teach 
all children about religion. For example there should be dhamma schools in all towns and 
villages.” Dhamma schools, as mentioned above, have been promoted and supported by the same 
broad network of monks and laypeople who promote Myanmar’s recent anti-Muslim discourse. 
 
These schools do teach children about the basics of the Buddhism, but they mix this with a 
healthy dose of anti-Muslim rhetoric (Walton 2014). As one woman who attended a dhamma 
school in Mandalay Division in 2014 explained to me, the most memorable parts of the 
curriculum were, “Don’t buy at Muslim shops. And the monks taught that 786 adds up to 21, 
which means that in the twenty-first century, Muslims will colonize Myanmar. Their goal is the 
Islamization of the whole world” (interview, Wai Wai Lwin, April 5, 2018).  
Comments stating simply that the listener liked the song, or that s/he affirmed the 
message of the song, may seem innocuous on their face, but are better understood as part and 
parcel of the hate speech circulating in Myanmar today. To “cherish Buddhism,” in this 
discourse, is not to peacefully love and promote one’s own religion, but rather to uphold the 
importance of discriminating against people of other religions. Therefore, the comments in these 
two categories are linked, in theme and intent, to comments in the third category listed on the 
table above. Comments in the third category consist of explicit hate speech. For example, after 
posting an affirming comment (cited above), Soe Soe wrote another comment in response to 
“You Should Not Be Cold-Hearted”: “Kick all the kala dogs out of our country.” In Myanmar, 
dogs are feral animals. Only the most elite people in the country have pet dogs; even in the 
biggest cities, it is still common to encounter feral dogs in packs roaming the streets, many of 
them seemingly injured and hungry. For a Burmese speaker, to equate a group of people with 
dogs is to dehumanize them in dramatic fashion. Soe Soe’s comment also underlines the 
exclusionary ideology (“Kick them out of our country”) at the heart of the anti-Muslim 
discourse. Explicitly hateful comments posted in response to “Losing One’s Nationality is a 
Concerning Issue” use similar language, repeating both the ethnic slur and the exclusionary 
language: “Dog-kala and dog-Christian do not belong in our land” (Ko Twe); “We can already 
 
see the customs of the kala dogs. The whole world knows their rude actions. Muslims are the shit 
of the whole world” (Kyaw Comet); “Myanmar women, you should not marry dogs, no matter 
how poor you are” (Vj Jeedphone); and “Kill all of the kala” (Yo Myanmar). 
Taken together, as I argue they should be, the comments in the first three categories listed 
on the table above constitute the majority of comments made about Burmese language anti-
Muslim songs. Comments which profess to like the song, those which affirm its message, and 
those which engage in explicit hate speech make up 73% of the comments responding to “Losing 
One’s Nationality is a Concerning Issue.” Similarly, comments in these three categories make up 
76% of the comments left in response to “You Should Not Be Cold-Hearted.” Stated most 
generally, roughly three quarters of the written internet responses to anti-Muslim hate songs 
support those songs in some way.  
Furthermore, listener responses reveal the power of anti-Muslim hate songs. The 
comments are responses to the songs; comments are posted online only after listeners hear the 
songs. As is explained above, the songs’ lyrics constitute incitement to genocidal violence 
according to the definition of the incitement articulated by the ICTR. By virtue of being posted 
on YouTube.com and by inviting comments, the songs are also provoking additional inciting 
speech among the commenters. The songs are not only part of a hateful discourse, they are also 
extending that discourse by sparking more hateful speech. Said another way: the makers and 
promoters of these songs are inciting violence against Myanmar Muslims not only by their own 
words (in their songs), but also by spurring listeners on to articulate more inciting speech.   
Conclusion 
 
It would be easy to dismiss a small corpus of pop songs as insignificant; indeed, that was 
a fatal mistake made by international observers, who were well aware of three hate songs being 
broadcast daily on Rwandan national radio, in the months leading up to the Rwandan genocide 
(McCoy 2009:94). Myanmar’s anti-Muslim hate songs are one facet of broader campaign, which 
includes speeches, videos, and internet postings, that continues to incite violence against Muslim 
people. Incitement is a “hallmark of genocide” (Benesch 2004:63) and a crucial “early warning 
indicator” that genocide is about to occur (Oberschall 2000:2). More specifically, the existence 
of an exclusionary ideology articulated and disseminated in inciting texts is an important 
precursor to genocide (Harff 2003:63). The relevance of an exclusionary ideology has been 
highlighted by leading genocide scholar Barbara Harff, who found that countries in which it is 
present are 2.5 times more likely to move toward genocide than countries with no such ideology 
(2003:66). Using her own model, which gives relative weight to a number of risk factors for 
genocide, in 2012 Harff published a list of countries that were at risk of genocide. The country at 
the very top of her list - the country with the very highest “risk index score” - was Myanmar 
(2012:55). The genocidal violence which exploded later that year in Myanmar is abundant 
evidence of the predictive strength of Harff’s model. Her repeated cautions about exclusionary 
ideology, which we hear articulated at length in Burmese language anti-Muslim hate songs, 
remind us of the significance of the songs. 
These songs also enflame further hateful sentiment among Myanmar Buddhists. This is 
evident in the dehumanizing comments that YouTube listeners make about the songs. Genocide 
Watch identifies dehumanization as one of the ten stages of genocide, and explains the purpose 
of it: “Dehumanization overcomes the normal human revulsion against murder. At this stage, 
hate propaganda in print and on hate radios is used to vilify the victim group. The majority group 
 
is taught to regard the other group as less than human, and even alien to their society” (Stanton 
2016; see also Oberschall 2000:2). Condoning violence and murder is counter to the prevailing 
morality in all human socities, and dehumanizing speech is therefore a necessary forerunner to 
genocidal violence: “The dominant group must come to see its putative victims as mortal threats 
(since killing can then be rationalized as self-defense), or as subhuman (as insects or animals), or 
both” (Benesch 2004:63). Dehumanizing comments on YouTube.com contribute to the larger 
hate speech campaign currently percolating in Myanmar, helping to convince lay Buddhists to 
condone the violent persecution of, and even killing of, their Muslim countrymen. 
YouTube.com announced that, as of December 2018, the company is making better 
efforts to remove “violative content” and “violative comments” (YouTube Official Blog 2018). 
As of the writing of this article, these efforts have not extended to the Burmese language anti-
Muslim hate songs and their associated hateful comments. The songs are therefore continuing to 
contribute to Myanmar’s cyber-space, which is not “an isolated domain of social action, but 
rather...an extension of pre-existing relationships, networks, and cultural practices” (McCarthy 
2018:102). Given that internet usage is increasing rapidly in Myanmar, it is vitally important to 
understand how the current anti-Muslim campaign is being furthered in that cyber-space.  
Although Facebook.com has made some progress in quashing the anti-Muslim hate speech 
which appears on their platform, YouTube.com continues to host songs which incite violence 
against Myanmar Muslims. These songs provoke further hate speech in their comment sections. 
This article went to press in early 2021, as unfolding events highlighted the issues raised 
in this article.  First, political leaders in the United States debated whether or not the former 
President had incited a mob which attacked the seat of government in order to overturn the 
results of a federal election.  Fearing future violence, major social media companies removed the 
 
President and some of his followers from their online platforms, effectively adjudicating the 
debate (BBC News 2021).  The actions of these companies, reported around the world, were a 
powerful reminder that inciting speech communicated via the internet is a major focus of concern 
for many.  Second, Myanmar experienced a military coup, and the coup leaders who took control 
of the national government immediately began instituting restrictions on internet access (Beech 
and Mozur 2021; Beech 2021).  As I concluded this article, it was unclear to what extent the 
Youtube videos described here would continue to be available to Myanmar citizens.  It was also 
impossible to predict how those controlling the levers of power would pursue the anti-Muslim 
campaign of the previous decade.  Nevertheless, I hope that the particulars of this study will 
remain relevant to my fellow scholars. The field of ethnomusicology is well positioned to 
undertake further investigations of musics’ and musicians’ roles in inciting violence elsewhere in 
the world, and elsewhere on the internet.  In so doing, ethnomusicologists will respond to one of 
the most pressing issues of our time. 
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“You Should Not Be Cold-Hearted”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cd93Oh6NGYw 
“Brave-Hearted Man”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RsSpS8oEKHE 
“Losing One’s Nationality is a Concerning Issue”: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n3bzk9mImYE 
“Oath”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dyRNSwY5Dkw 
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